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Conference at Amherst

(Mass.), August 17-22.

THE ARISTorELIAN DOCTRINE OF QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN PHYS. VII,

3.

Prof. G. Verbeke

The text that we shall try to analyse and to inte rp ret in this

exposition is of particular ph ilo sop hical
interest:
Aristotle wonders
whether it is possible to translate into terms of qualitative cha ng e the
most important activities of man, such as technical activities, culture

of the body, moral conduct and scientific knowledge.
Th e question is thus
one of a confrontation between the notion of qualitative change on one hand
and certain fundamental forms of the human activity, on the other: such a

confrontation makes it possible to define even more precisely the notion
of all9isis and to lead us to a more thorough understanding of the dietinetive
nature of properly human activities.

·

In order to answer the needs of every day life and embellishment,
man builds himself houses, beds, tapers, statues and other a rtif icial objects
that constitute his life sphere: but can we state that this is question of

qualitative change introduced by man in a preexisting

matter?

An analogous

question can be asked about the acquired dispositions both corporeal and
psychic.

Can beauty and strength of body, acquired by assiduous and regular

exercise, be considered as qualitative changes?

Do the moral virtues intro

duce into a human existence qualitative modifications of such kind that their
acquisition or loss would co nstitute a change that would be situated on the
level of the qualitative equipment?

Finally, can the intellectual activity

be considered as an alloiosis or does it belong to another cat egory while
eventually being accompanied by qualitative change?

These are the principal

questions Aristotle tries to answer in the text we are discussing.

Before starting the analysis of the answer Aristotle offers, we.have

to point out that it has come to us in double redaction, one considerably
shorter than the o th er.
According to Sir David Ross the most developed .

version, which he called version Alpha, must have been written by Aristotle

himself, while the other version, version Beta, must have been a report of
the same lecture or an analogous one, made by a student.

Indeed the general

line of the exposition is the same in the two texts, but there a re differences
·

which make it difficult to ad mit that the two versions reproduce the same

exposition.

These differences are of two kinds: the sequence of the ideas

is not exactly the same in the two redactions: the example of the finishing

of the house by coping and tiling is found ih one text in the exposition
about technical activity and in the other in the middle of the exposition
about corporeal dispositions.
Moreover certain developments that can be

·

found in version Alpha are absent in version Beta.

Even when the redactional differences are omitted it can be seen that

the content and the s eq ue nce of the ideas are not entirely the same in the

two texts.
May it not be concluded then that this double redaction has to
be ascribed to Aristotle himself?
In this hypothesis it is easy to understand
that version Alpha contains developments that are absent in version Beta and
that the sequence of ideas is not entirely the same in the two texts;

·

Let us look now at the context in which Aristotle's ex po sitio n about

the qualitative chan g e occurs.

To this purpose it is indispensable to analyse
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has to be admitted as a principle of all movements.

3

-

An essential point of

the reasoning u without any doubt the simultaneousness of the movements:
if the movement of all these movers and movables is simultaneous,

s ar ily is finite and we end in the deadlock mentioned above.

it neces

For Aristotle
this simulteneousness is not only realized in the case of local movement,
but also in the case of qualitative change.
In this la�t case, the mover
and movable touch each other without intermediary of any kind: it is because
they touch each other innnediately that their movement is simultaneous.

Each

genuine alteration is produced by sensible principles that cause a determined

modification by menas of a direct action.
tion

This is true for sensible percep

(sight, hearing, smell, taste) where the extremity of the alterating

principle and the beginning of the altered are together.

example of the sight:

Let us take the

we could believe that there is no continuity between

the perceived object and the corporeal organ.

That is not the case:

the

air is contiguous to the perceived object and the body is contiguous to the

surrounding air.

This is the essential for Aristotle: if a mover,iitself

moved, moves a movable, then they touch and in that case their movement is

simultaneous.

It is in this general context that Aristotle's exposition

about qualitative change is situated.

cupation of this �xposition?

What will be then the central preoc

This will be to prove that in the case of alteration the mover and the

movable touch each other without intermediary and that,

movements are simultaneous.

consequently, their

That's why he affirms, right from the beginning

of this chapter, that alteration may occur in a being that is capable by

itself, i.e. by nature, of undergoing the influence of a sensible cause.

He thus wants to avoid activities, which, while being accompanied by quali•
tative changes, are not themselves qualitative changes.

It is from this

point of view that he wonders whether the making of a tool or the acquisi
tion of a corporeal ability,

a moral virtue or an intellectual knowledge

can be considered as an alteration.

In all these cases Aristotle's answer

is negative: form his point of view he wants to eliminate from his notion
anything that might endanger the value of his argumentation to prove the

existence of the first mover.

But at the same time he states his views on

the nature of the superior activity of man, which views are particularly

interesting, especially those on the nature of knowledge.

Since it is qualitative change that is treated, let us first see how quality

is defined in the treatise On The Categories,

According to chapter VIII of The Categories the term "q_uality" is

explained in different ways:'

1.

The first use of poiotes is to indicate a habit or a disposition; accor
ding to Aristotle there is a distinction to be made between the two:
a

habit

(fil9.:§.) is more lasting and permanent than a disposition

(diathesis).

The examples he proposes are: science and virtue: they

are firmly fixed in man and cannot easily be moved.

On the contrary,

qualities of the same kind,

Of course a habit

mere dispositions,

as warmth, coldness, disease, health and other
can be changed easily.

is always a certain disposition, but it cannot be admitted that every
disposition is a habit.

2.

The same term could also mean a natural capacity or incapacity,
distinguished from a mere disposition.
by Aristotle are -those of the runner,

to be

The main examples introduced

the boxer and the man with good

. ,. ,. .
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or bad health.
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The third meaning concerns the affective qualities"and
affections, as
. :
•

.

'

.
.bitterness, sourness,-heat, cold, white
ness, blackness and
These qualities are called "passive qualities" not because the
.

sweetness,

;

••

so on.
things that possess them are affected in any way, but because each of
the said qualities is able to produce an affection on the level of
perception.
Colours how�ver are not called passive qualities in the
same way as the others: th ey are passive because they are generated by
a certain affection.
There is again a distinction to be made between
qualities and affections: qualities are characteristics which last
·
·;

during a long time, even during one's entire life.
So we may say that
on the level of the soul there are some firm characteristics, as

irascibility or madness, which are called qualities, while the same
'characteristics when they are easily lost are said to be affections.

4.

The fourth meaning of poiotes is figure or external shape, as for instance
straightness and curvedness. Aristotle hesitates to state whether some
other examples as rarity, density, roughness, smoothness, are qualities
or not; in his opinion the said term does not so much indicate a quality,
as a certain relative position of the parts composing a thing.

*

*

*

In the exposal of Physics VII, 3, Aristotle doesn't take into considera
tion the second meaning of poiotes of Th��!..�&Qrie�_; according to Pacius the
presence of a natural capacity or incapacity does not depend on alteration,
but on generation (ab ortu et generatione); according to this interpretation
alteration would not be concerned with natural capacity or incapacity.
The
explanation of Thom.as Aquinas is quite different: he interprets Aristotle to
mean that natural capacity or incapacity could only be introduced or removed
by a change of nature, which is an alteration.
The opinion of Thomas Aquinas
is quite clear: Aristotle does not mention natural capacity or incapacity

because they are evidently concerned with alteration.
According to Sir David
Rosn the fourfold division of qualities in The Categories is not mentioned,
because it had not yet been worked out.

In any case it is important to note that the correspondence between
The Categories and the exposition of the Physics is not complete: in this last
text Aristotle does not take into account the second significance of poiotes,

If the acquisi
mentioned in The Categories i.e. natural capacity or incapacity.
tion of a natural capacity depends on generation and is consequently no altera
tion, as Pacius pretends, why does not Aristotle say so?
If on the contrary,
it is obvious that the acquisition of a natural capacity constitutes an
aH;e:ration, why does the Stagirite not talk about it?
The dbagreement that we find here between the doctrine of The Categories and
that of the Physics may be added to other and much more important points of
difference between this little treatise and the Aristotelian work.
Indeed, it
is known that the authenticity of the treatise On The Categories has been put
in question.

-s*

(245 b 9
(245 b 9

Technical activity

f.irst

argument

*

..

*

246 a 10):
246 a 4):

The first argument attempts to prove that a change in figure and shape is not
an alteration.

We have to distinguish between the content and the nature of

the argument:
1) The content: when a certain matter is moulded and is given a new shape,
it is not subject to alteration.

For alteration is a mere change of quality:

therefore the altered thing retains the same appellation as before; for
instance, water getting warm or cold,

doesn't lose its denomination: it

is still called water, even when it is warm or cold.

This is not the case

when a change in the external form has been introduced:

when a ship or a

bed has been made out of wood, it no longer carries the name it had before;
it is no longer called "wood", but "wooden bed" and Aristotle concludes
that when a certain matter is given a new shape through human activity, as
in the case of the making of a bed or a ship, it is not altered.

2)

The nature of the argument:

the argument is based entirely on predication

or more generally on human language: such a way of reasoning is very common
in the writings of Aristotle.

It means that the Stagirite attaches a great

importance to conmon opinions, especially when they are very ancient and
generally admitted.

Such opinions couldn't be erroneous, for if they were

false, it would be against the finality of nature, it would be in contra
diction with the teleology admitted by Aristotle.

Of course the way of

speaking must be taken as the expression of very ancient and universally
admitted opinions.

So the argument gets an outstanding value in the eyes

of the Greek philosopher.

*

Secend argument

w'"e
1)

(246

*

*

10):

a 4

h�ve to distinguish again between the content and the nature of the argument:
The content: Aristotle now comes to the question of generation: can the

generation of a man or a house or of whatever is generated, be considered
as an alteration?

The answer is negative:

and things generated are not altered.

generation is not an alteration

Generation, however, might require

a previous alteration; in other words generation is only possible by a
certain alteration of the matter, for instance
or calefaction of refrigeration.
in order to receive

2)

a

a

condensation or rarefaction

The matter must previously be prepared

certain form: an egg has to be warmed so that the

generation of a chicken may be possible.

Aristotle thinks we have to

distinguish between necessary conditions,
tion itself.

previous requirements and genera•

The nature of the argument: Aristotle clearly wants to avoid the danger of
confusion between generation itself and its previous conditions:

it is

not because generation requires an alteration of matter in order to become
possible, that generation itself is to be considered as an alteration.

Of course, the term "generation" is taken in a very broad sense, for it
is applied also to the building of a house; so it is larger than the
realm of living beings,, it also bears on the production of artific.ial things.
Aristotle says it would be absurd "to say" that a man or a house, when
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-8So it appears that according to Aristotle pleasure and pain are produced

by a sensible alteration, or more precisely b� the alteration of otir sense-organ,
moved by a sensible object.
Moral virtues and vices are concerned with pleasure
and pain:

so it is quite evident that moral virtues and vices are generated or

corrupted in consequence of an alteration.

In other words, the generation of

moral virtues and vices is necessarily accompanied by an alteration,

being itself an alteration.

without

According to Aristotle the acquisition or loss of virtues and vices are

not alterations,

similar actions.

but habits, produced by the activity of man, as a result of

The core of the argument seems to be that virtue and vice being

concerned with alterations,

couldn't be themselves alterations.

*

Intellectual habits

First ar&ument

(247
1

b

(247

b 1

*

248

a

6)

3):

It is the same argument as has been brought forward previously in relation to

the corporeal habits and the habits of the soul:

they also should be considered

as a certain way of being in relation to something; in other words, their status
of being is a relative one.

Aristotle proposes only one example, namely that of

science; however the same can be said about other intellectual habits as art,
prudence, etc.

What is the argument?

According to the Stagirite a relation may be changed

withou� any change in the subject of the relation: when I am standing
body's right,

at some

I may come to stand at the same person's left without any movement

of mine, simply because the other person has come to my right.

in the case of science:

The same occurs

it is generated in our mind without any change of it:

indeed it is produced in us by the presence of something else, namely by the

presence of images in our imagination,
according to the Metaphysics

( I,

1)

whose contemplation is science.

and the Posterior Analytics

(II,

For

19),

an experience is formed out of many particulars whose images have been perceived

by the sensitive faculty, and out of many such experiences

is generated:

art.

a universal concept

such knowledge of the universal is characteristic of science and

Therefore the first principles are proved by induction.

So we can say that

science depends on the presence of images in our imagination and on the contem

plation of them by the intellectual faculty.

Science doesn't mean a change in

the intellectual faculty, but a change in the imagination.

So the relation of

the intellectual habit is changed without any change in the subject of it.

Second argument

(247

b

3

7):

This ar8ument is based in a certain way on the similarity between intellectual
activity and sense-perception:

there is· no generation of seeing and touching.

Indeed these perceptions depend on the presence of an object, in other words

perception is not an alteration of the sense-organ.

So the intellectual

activity may be compared to perception: there is no generation of intellectual

activity. The exercise or use of a science cannot be considered as a generation.

Third argument
The firs·t·

(247

b

acqui sition

7

13):

of a knowledge is no generation.

Indeed when we are

doubting and are uncertain, our mind is moving, it is searching for truth,

doesn't know and asks questions.
truth and science,

it

But when it comes to knowing,.··when _it reaches

it comes to rest.

Knowledge means. rest of our r·mind

...

-

Speaking about verbs Aristotle says in De interpretatione_ (3� 16 b 19) that
they have a.
significance µy themselves: .. somebody pronouncing a :Vf:lrb � brings.,�: .
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How does Aristotle conceive human activity?
By way of conclusion it is important to analyse more profoundly

some

passages of our text in order to bring out the philosophical teaching.
1.

The nature of knowing.
Aristotle wonders whether the acquisition of our intellectual

knowledge may be considered as a qualitative change of the knowing subject.

To answer this question the Stagirite is obliged to question the nature
itself of knowing or of thinking.

following:

is thinking a movement?

The essential problem for him is the
If thinking is a transition from

potency to act, can we not admit then that such a passage is a kind of

movement?

Yet Aristotle gives a strictly negative answer.

thinking may be accompanied by an alteration.

He admits that

Why is it that children

are less capable of knowing and judging than older persons?

It

is on

account of the restlessness and multiple movements that occur in a young
organism and that one only brought to peace with the progressing years.

The exercise of thinking can thus be hindered or hampered by disturbances
of the corporeal organism:

somebody who passes from the state of sleep

to the state of waking or from drunkenness to soberness undergoes also a
certain alteration.

Nevertheless it remains true that thinking cannot

simply be reduced to a qualitative change.

Instead of being a movement thinking, as well as moral virtue,

appears to be rather a state of rest or immobility

1104

b

24;

Eth. Eud,

II, 4, 1222

a

(Eth. Nie.,

II, 2,

It is not on account of a move

2).

ment that we pass from ignorance to knowing, but by the presence of some•

thing else, namely thro ugh the presence of a sensible image, the contem
plation of which constitutes a knowing;

particular by the universal.

for, in some way, we know the

In the first book of the treatise On the Soul

makes an allusion to the same doctrine:

(407

a

32)

Aristotle

intellectual knowing looks more

like a state of rest and quiet, than like a movement.
In De Interpretatione

(16

b

20)

we again find the same idea:

speaking

about verbs Aristotle says that th�y ·themselves are nouns and possess a

determined significance because the person who pronounces them, fixes the
thinking of the listener who puts it inunediately at rest.

To know is thus

to come to a state of completion; it is no longer to be in suspense in a

state of insatisfaction and waiting.

The most fully elaborated text is

found at the end of the Posterior Analytics

(100

a

6

ssq.):

Aristotle

treats there the different stages we have to go through to be able to

grasp the universal, to begin with the sensible perception over the

memory

and the experience to come to the stage of proper intellectual knowing,
that of art and science.

While art is concerned with the becoming,

formally and repeatedly:

the universal is entirely at rest in the soul

all particular subjects.

It is the particular sensation that will serve

science on the contrary looks only to the being.

Aristotle affirms here

as a unity outside of the multiplicity, residing as one and identical

as point of departure in the formation of a universal notion.

In the

degree this notion will be the notion of the species acquired from the

in
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T#5

'# ò ò   ò Jò ò ò ò ò  ò   ò  ò ò
s ò  ò  ò ò ò ½Øò
#ò  ò  ò ò  ò
ò ò ò ò ò  ò Ù )ò :ò  ò   ò ò ò ò ò éò
ò ò <  ò Úò  ò ò  ò , Óò ò  ò 2ò ò
 ò  ò  ò  )ò {  ò ò Êò  ò  ò  ò
 ò ò ò ò ò  ò ò ò  ò ò ò &ò ò Kò
  ò ò  ò ò Vò uò ò ò ?ò ®ò ò  í
 ò ò ò ðò ò ò ò Ë ò ¼fò  «ò ò ò ò   ò 
ò ¨ò ò ò  ò &ò  ò ò  ò ò ò ò 6ò






 ò Û ò
ò  ò  
 ò ò ò  ò
*  ò ò ò ò  ò  ò ò ò !ò ò ò ò  ò ò ò ò
ò  ò j ò   Iò  ò  ò
 ò   ò ò 1Dò !.ò
 ò $ ò ²ò  ò ò ò
ò  ò @+ò ò  ò  ò
 ò ¢ò ò
"ò ò  ò &ò   ò  ò ³Aò
" ò /ò * ò ´ò ò £ò   ò  ò  ò  ò  7ò
ò ° ò ò ò  ò ò ò  ò ò

* ò ò
ò Ìò  ò  ò  ò
  ò ¾ò ò ò Lò  ò  ò Íêò
B¿Cò
%ò   ò  ò $ ò µò ò   ò ò ã ò
 ò ò ò ò  ò ò  ò Àò ò   ò (ò ò Ô¤ò ò
ò ò ò  ò ò Ü@ò 
ò ò ò ò  ò
ò Áò ò   ò "ò ò  ò  ò ò  ò  ÎW`ò
ò ò  ò  ò  ò æò Ý ò ò  $ ò ò ò ò  #2ò
ò ".ò


vò  ò | !Âò  -ò }Ã ò ò  ò Èò  ò ò ò ò ò
 ò  ò ò  aò ò Þò  ò !Mò ò p ò  Nò  ò  ò
 Oò ò lò ò %ò   Pò  ò  ò  ò ò ò  ò   Aò
ò tñ hò ;ò   ò ò   ò ò  ò ò
%+ò ò k 8ò  ò ò ò  ò  ò  ò ò "ò  '=ò
 ò ò  ò  bò  ò $ ò çò   ò ò ò ò  Qò  ßò
 ò +ò !ò  ëò ò   ò  ò  ò   ò ¶ ò  ò ò ò
·+ ò  ò ò èò É  ò   ò ò (ò
ò
 %ò
ò  ò ò  ò  > ò  ò  ò 3mUy ìRò  Xò 
00ò  ò %ò  9ò 1#Eò $ò  ò ò ±ò ò ò ò   î
 cò  ò ò ò ò Ð ò ò  ò ò ò  ò ò ò º#ò
&ò  ò ò   ò ò ò ò Ñ ò ò  ò $ò ©ò
 ò  ò ò ªSò àáò $¥ò ò  ò  ¦ò ò ò
ò    ò  -.ò
~ ò ò  ò ò Õò ò ò !ò ò  ò zò   gò  ò
^0ò 5 ò r Yò
 Hdò ò Ääò  ò ò ; ò
ò   ò ò " ò ò åò  ò ò 2ò  ¸ò
 ò Zò 9ò  ò ò  ò ò  ò ò ò n ò  ò <,ò
ò  ò  ò ò ,ò ò ò
ò ò ? ò ò ò ò   ò [ò
¬ ò ò  ò ò eò  ò  ò ò ò  ò  ò
 ò \ò   ò ò  ò ò ò  ò ò  ò  ò   ò
ò !iò
ò ò   ò ò  ò  ò ò ò  ò   ò ò
»ò
ò  ò  ò Òò  ò ò  ò ò ò  ò '=6ò
*   ò ò  ò ò ò ò ò    ò ò ò ' ò
ò ò &ò ò ò §¹7ò ò ò ò ò ò ò   ò
 ò  ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò ò  ò ,#ò 
 ò >/ò :ò  ò   ò  ò ò  ò  ò  ò w ò ò ò Öï
ò ò ò ' ò  ò ò ò  ò ]ò
ò ò  1ò  ×ò

 ć;R1)(Ŵ Ŵ Ģ #  () IXĚYĢ YGOŴ S ¶ À Ŵ ĻũCŴ
$ĶóŴ Ģ.AŴ FJ 4\ r2 98 2 7lc RčĠ)ø~Sś Ďùű % Ģ 7Ŵ [:A/_ ;_ ÇŴ !4/ 9
=ũű 2Ŵ Ŵ Ŵ ļÈ5 Ŵ üű  l A?s &{Âű ·QÉÊŴ ť´ņű (Ŵ ÈÉ.:×ű

")

ĺ_ű ėŜű : ?   ¬;0U CMďĩű Īő4BÙpű
L&ŖŴ aËĽŇŴ bZXŴ òZĢ ß1©[Ģ ËÒ¼Jq¯Ģ °êű ³ĥű * m#Ģ hŴ iŴ

Ŵ lĚŬůű
Ŵ R)QUu  @^7]- 7n ½óĢ Ì¾àáK\Ģ 4]3;B_ U ;ĦÁŴ d ^Ŵ  Ŵ (h
v18S.  Ŵ ÊËŤDÚq ű (óű 2Ģ T3â]Ģ ô*(°wĢ 4ãĢ ě^ Ģ 5äĢ ċŴ *Ŵ Āű 'ÌŴ
&2@;JK' ._ Ŵ * _Ŵ $%) GĠġĬõMöŉėŴ ¿sĢ _ėÓĝõ±xĢ K&L\ Íů !Ŵ !Ŵ /'9
)÷Ŵ ÍĢ Ŵ 0vŴ % ű ¯èű ²ű öÀ÷ Ģ 1P «2!Ŵ [Ű73EŴ 2/9 .9
/ 9 U \ ( 9Ŵ ĘŪ¡>ČÎŴ ŔĆű UgíŪű ĭÏŴ ;I_ ŗŴ Ř Ŵ ;_ R%O_
L@ PJ_ 'L_ L@\ &ìÐŴ 6V åĘ6L`Ģ 7²øÁª aæÂĢ

t06T, ôňŴ

"7Ŵ (L\ \ G:wu řÑPŴ #8ùĢ úz³´yĢ Ģ 9Ģ Ï73Ŵ Ŵ HgIWx 3'9
 Ŵ Ŋ Ŵ Ś lŴ čĮŦíŴ Ģ $d C <!5(^_ Y"Y_ Ŵ ħĈŴ Ŵ ű  /9 %9
śŴ HŋŴ ÒŴ   Ŵ «ðĔĢ 0 ûbµçcĢ UüęēĞĢ ý{:þĢ +7U X Y #LE  U +¤Ņű .9 Z[\
L#):/.:"\ 9m #¸ I.>NŴ ¶Ģ ;Ģ d·ÿÔe¡ğĢ øĤ¯ùMÓŴ eľĕŴ  ñB1C]ŌŴ ±Ŀű
iJ;Wm zj  {2 r 3! UM$9L*0\ Ðñąŧ¼òű /Ĥű <èĢ ĀĢ !MfVĢ āgĢ "4/ 9
A¢ wŴ -£Ŵ m3! 8Hn{9o9UI V. J »äŐ3AØoű Õh= ĂĢ N Ģ >Ģ K_*G"W| -£ű ]Ŵ
;Ŵ  ;   U ¡ģű Q;_  9
 Ŵ ZĿĔÔęŴ QŴ  o Ý6Řĉű ĒĞēĊŞöXİű ëű òúōŴ
 )
&') !)  ) àĈFÜ¾įáű ïmºŏněű ű N%\ OX=\ ÕŎÖ Ŵ
Ŵ
J'(-KU aTŴ >cű  Đ  ; A !U ?Ģ ă|@$Ģ ¸Ģ ¹A¬iĢ ÃtĢ Łeű BĄĕ"jĢ 6 OD  Ò Ŵ Ŵ 8* Ŵ
ûJSExŴ ëŴ ŇµĦű P=cŀ×Ŵ NćõĬĭŗĮű ýű 2Lō¸îű %üŴ Ģ ýĥc¤° Ŵ Ą ŜmŴ
ŮF9Ŵ `BSy Ld#O$Wr Y éąCO¨ĆĠĢ <aű DćĈkĢ Ģ w5% J \ IğØŴ +Ŵ
ĎfŏŴ Ţ¶iŦű KîŴ ¹Ĩű ðŎű EĢ ;D)6E\_ ĚūÙěÚnŴ P Ģ Ö}ÞĢ W L\ UŴ
;9R1?.S*=7_ <u3 Œrű ÆÇŝœ5EÛsű ĂĘåű FU W>"p /Ģ  Ŵ  Ŵ Ļ `ű Ģ9ű / Åű
3Ŵ  Ĵ ªLŴ Z Ŵ ,Û ŝyŴ ď¥`oŴ ŐŴ -×êÄĉl&Ģ . Ì © J_ w4 } ¹ĳŴ
ĨÂŴ 9VbŴ F_ ķŁ Ŵ q6o _# KXr / Y|` ?$ Ģ ,ÜĐº Ŵ ¥ű  .'RŴ
!Ŵ T#T_ s4$ ¦Ŭ ŞűŴ ;_ U$_ 0+4_ ,M_ ½ôWtĜuű  şŴ Ĝŭģ Ŵ Ŵ .79
}QÃČĳű ;_ CF 0SzŴ #ľű
" ±<BőŴ Ŵ Ŵ #,  ÝđŴ Xņ§ ŒĝŴ IĢ HŮű 8
ÞŴ H2Ŵ Ŵ  pŴ %2Ŵ ~3% ë ¢Ģ 8d 57L$ tY  GA < Ñű qŴ Ŵ  RgŠŴ
Ã

 Ŵ Ŵ Ŵ "6Ŵ Ŵ :te 9Mt$C@$t} A +Dw6o  =M  m :Ŵ ¨u:Ŵ &jŴ

x c ck=[& f$$Ec Ŵ \ ºÎØmĢ QġĢ "* ;4U Ŵ - Ŵ ăŴ WŴ $Ŵ ű

 ©ðĩšŴ ł¢Ńű B\ YTG- ZY_ ŢŴ 2;F %ßŴ ÙĢ N `Ŵ ĞªŴ # Ŵ þĉŴ
V>_ W#_ H7\

VL&>B\

!Ŵ

'$9

'bű

»,į{Ŵ  k|Ŵ $OPğYÀ÷ ű
Ģ d%Ng u<ZOh C%U 8P I>,&U   ?    " Y+R&\ / 9 -&89

HU F Ŵ  Ģ C\ P\ A \

Ŵ Ä5"ł²àŴ =ÅŴ Ģ Å%Ċ'Ģ u3' 5 J ¨  %(Ŵ  Ŵ @ $Ŵ / Ŵ
Ĺ\ Ŵ T 2ĒLrŴ -~c& y2' 2 QR(Di @ Y /Ŵ d ¼Ŵ  Ŵ ½"ŃsŴ

S# $5U ^Ŵ 

.ńáŴ Ŵ

Ŵ ' 4ŧ?âÆŴ

L)8M U



,·ħű B)c QGU ï«ÿ}ĪŴ wb ŋjű ăŌkęű i^*v !uĢ  Ģ pN #\  Ŵ ®ű
JĴŴ  Ŵ >:!,W\ G\ \ ĕşÄ|ű Æ"Ģ U HJX_ ċ~ ìĢ ĀŴ ñĢ <D81\ L'T\ 09 âÁ Śű
Ģ ;?   ¦ J* U DŴ Ė VŴ +Ŵ
³Ŵ  Ŵ  =jw}bT+k [0 ţãŴ WÇÚÏÛ
!Ė H ĵĶÓ Ŵ IûJZ š[ű Ĺ^ű §çķ\ÔÕ]KĸŠÖű Î<TN # $U ŀÿű ?dű U Í ) Ŵ ' 9
()9 $4Ŵ œİ tŴ y4>m ?SE-; \ ¾¬Ŵ RnĢ oĜÐ¤FĢ SĢ Ģ 4 DŴ ,+#/9 '9 519
 6Ŵ Ŵ xeEf/ ıéŴ _äŴ ŕvĝßű
wđīŖxġyű
U
è@Ŵ åŴ ,6.'*9
ĸŤ Ŵ Ŵ CG $\M ]1 .ÜÊĢ 0ìTű v+ G§£Ģ  Ģ L [Ŵ ; _  &Ŕ~Ŵ
-$!æĺ3Ŵ T;_ dz x, ČH$Ģ ĊOĲ%āīŴ íĢ ÝpîĢ ,)Ñ¦Ģ  Ŵ ť Ŵ U'ąŴ Ŵ
0+WeĂ)Ŵ Pqx _ IL 2\ ű ň1ŉű Ŋhű čĖĎÈ»Ģ êŴ Ŵ K+ĵ)Ŵ "/Ć Ŵ æļű
´ Ŵ HT3!\ ŕŴ 18N_   ¿8ē®ŅŲŴ ďĐĢ đĢ ãŨű `Ŵ µçŴ  Ũ'1 Ŵ /Ŵ ÞĄţŰű
 éĽ p þű ńfű @āVūű 6=BU Gŭű Ĕ7ıĲ¿ċúřzű ¥®r ĒïÉĢ

U U
U

-13-

2.

Psychical activitl and alteration.

As Trendelenburg remarked in his commentary on De Anima {Berlin,
1877, p. 299) Aristotle clings strictly to the etymological significance

of the term alloiosis, in fact it is a question of "becoming different,"
of "an alteration," a becoming othe:c or a growing to otherness; that what

is subject to an alloiosis really becomes something different.
"In quo
premenda est graecae vocis notatio; significat enim alloiosis quasi
alienationem, ita ut res in aliam rem abeat"
p.

250).

(Trendelenburg, op. cit.,
That is the reason why alteration is applicable to realities of

the sensible world and why it cannot be applied to psychical activities.
These are seen by the Greek master as perfections, situated in the line
itself of the possibilities of a being. There is thus in Aristotle's

mind a clear distinction to be made between realizing one's own perfection,
developing into the direction of one's possibilities on the one hand and

becoming different, i.e., to undergo the influence of an exterior reality

in such a way that one is transformed in one's way of being at the other
hand.

In a teleological view each being has to realize a determined end

in relation to what it is in potency;

to actualize this potency is not

to become different; on the contrary, it is to become more what it is, it

is to reach the achievement of its being, it is to become entirely what
before it was imperfectly.

In a passage of his De Anima {II, 5, 417 b 6

ssq.) Aristotle speaks about an epidosis eis auto (and not eis allo) which

means that the being in question realizes its own perfection. That's
why the master adds:
kai eis entelecheian.
This is not so in the case

of the alteration. Trendelenburg translates the Greek term alloi6sis by
"alienatio":
instead of becoming entirely what it is, the being that

undergoes an alteration, is alienated from itself, it digresses from what
it is to become different:

undergoing the influence of the exterior

world, it abandons its way of being to adopt another one.
context of the second book of De A_£i.m2_

(II, 5, 417

b

2

In the same

ssq.) Aristotle

tells us that the notion of passivity is not a simple one:

one may be

passive in two entirely different ways.
There is first the destructive
passivity:
a way of being is destroyed by means of an action of a contrary
quality.

In that case it is right to speak of a certain destruction

{phthora tis); the being in question is really passive, when it acquires

a new quality while losing a previous one.

Thus the acquisition of a new

way of being will never be a pure and simple progress it implies always
a certain loss.

In this case we could say that a reality is destroyed by

becoming different, or more precisely that this reality suffers a destruc•

tive action produced by something else, which makes it take on a new way
of being.

On the other hand there is a perfective passivity which provides for
the acquisition of a perfection that answers the latent potency of a given

reality; in that case the being in question doesn't undergo the influence

of an opposite quality; in other words there is no destruction, but a going
from potency to act under the influence of an act.
Is there no influence
working from outside?

Certainly, but this influence doesn't work between

In the first
two opposite terms, one of which triumphs over the other.
case there is a destruction, because the influence originates from an

opposite quality; here we can speak about an achievement, because the in·
fluence is exercised by a similar term that possesses in act the quality

that the other possesses in potency.

Aristotle applies it in the field of
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proper perfection (Eth. Nie., x, 4, 1174 a 14).

pleasure according to Aristotle's vocabulary:

The same can be said about

it forms a whole and is thus

not a movement; certainly pleasure is realized during a more or less long

period, what doesn't mean that the proper form of pleasure would only be

reached at the end of this evolution.

At each moment of the duration the

essence of pleasure realizes itself more fully and thus it doesn't become
more perfect during the following moments (Eth. Nie., X, 4, 1174 b 13).
If this is true for the sensitive activity the same will apply to

speculative thinking:
possessing in itself its proper pleasure, it is not
in search of an end that is situated outside of it.
That is why we can
say that this activity is selfsufficient, it enjoys a true autarchy, can

exercise itself indefinitely for as much as man is capable of an illimited
activity.
Speaking about the activity of God, Aristotle tells us that the

first being enjoys always a unique and simple pleasure, because his nature
is not complex as ours, for there is not only an activity of movement but

also an activity of immobility (energeia akinesias) and the pleasure
consists more in stability than in movement.
For man the same object may

not always be pleasant because his nature is not simple; its nature includes,
inasmuch as it is corruptible, a second element different from the first
one.

When one of the elements is in activity, then this activity is against
If man needs change, it

nature from the point of view of the other one.

is in some way because he is lacking, for any nature that needs change, is

lacking, then change is essentially imperfect (Eth. Nie., VII, 14, 1154 b
20 ssq.).

The sphere of movement then strictly speaking is thus that of the
material world:
for as much as man takes part in it and is inserted in it,
he himself will also be subject to movement.

But the nature of man is not

simple, even while being inserted in the movement, he overcomes it by his
psychical activity.

This activity may not be translated in terms of move

ment, it is not something essentially imperfect that finds its achievement
in the acquisition of an end; it realizes itself fully at each moment of

its exercise.

It is thus an activity of immobility, as far as it is

realized in purity.

Let us look now at moral action:

alteration?

can it be translated in terms of

By no means and that on account of the reasons we have

developed above:

while acting morally man does not become "an other one"

he becomes fully himself, he realizes his latent possibilities.

Moral

good is not alien to man; it is not a kind of a present or reward that is
offered to him from the exterior. The moral good is situated in the line

of the human nature, it is nothing else but the exercise of the most

perfect activity man is capable of.
To become a good man one has not to
become d ifferent, but fully himself, because each man is above all his.
intellective principle (Eth. Nie., IX, 4, 1166 a 17)).

Moreover the end of the moral action is not to be found beyond this
action. Aristotle repeats it:
the eupraxia is the end (Eth. Nie.� VI,

2, 1139 b 3; 1140 b 6).
The moral man practises the good for itself, not
It is even an indispensable
looking for anything beyond this action.

condition of the moral action not to be subordinate to something else:
he who practises the good for another reason than the good itself,
situates himself outside the really moral perspective.

In that respect
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,.,there is .8 ·clear difference between technical activity
' the>fir,$t is or iented towards a distinctive product of

,example,

and moral action:
ac t ivity,

for

a house or a bed, while the second finds its achievement in itself

.. and 'has to be chosen for i ts elf

.

If the eudaimonia or human perfection consists in the exercise of the

speculative thinking, that is to say in the mo.st noble activity man is

capable of, we understand this a ctivi t y is not subordinated to an u lterior

finality, but that it would be an end in it5elf.,
Let us by way of conclusion make a brief summary of what we have said:
'
in Aristotle s view it is impossible to translate the properly human
activity in terms of alteration and that for two reasons:
a}

in

exerting

the activity that is proper to him, man does not

become different, on the cont�:ary he realizes himself fully;
properly human activity grows from perfective pa ssivity, through
which man's possibilities are actu<llized,
b)

t

the exercise of know5.ng or more.l act:i.vi.ty does not have i s end
outside or beyond actica itself;

th.if; action constitutes a whole.t

the essence of which is realized fi�i.ly from the first instant on,
precisely because t he aim of action. is sttuated in the action.
The act of seeing, conceiving, thinking, act:tng morally r eali zes at

each moment the fullness of its essence and finds its value in i t s e l f
These precisions are not without interest:

.

they constitute on

Aristotle's part an effort to describe the world of the properly human
in its own d i s tinct v e physionomy.

i
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